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For the purposes of this paper, conditional imperatives (henceforth CIs) are indica-
tive conditionals whose consequent has the grammatical form of an imperative,
illustrated in (1).
(1) a. If you are at an intersection, turn right!
b. If you reach an intersection, turn right!
The main goal of this paper is to develop a unified semantic analysis of CIs, one
which adequately captures their similarities to (unconditional) imperatives on the
one hand and (unimperative) conditionals, on the other. Both of those latter phe-
nomena have been explored extensively and, differences over theoretical framework
and formal implementation notwithstanding, are comparatively well-understood. In
tackling CIs, then, the first question to ask is whether or to what extent their seman-
tic behavior can be captured by simply combining an analysis of imperatives with
one of conditionals. We show in this paper that the answer is affirmative in princi-
ple, but that CIs also raise a number of specific challenges which in turn inform the
analysis of imperatives and conditionals in general.
1. Preliminaries
Before we begin to present our unified account, the first question is which analy-
ses for conditionals and imperatives to build it on. In particular, conditionals are
known as a class of constructions rather than a uniform phenomenon (cf. Bhatt
and Pancheva, 2006). Besides hypothetical conditionals as in (2), we find at least
relevance and factual conditionals.
(2) a. If she is smart, she accepted the offer.
b. If she gets the offer, she will accept it.
(3) a. If you are thirsty, there is a beer in the frige. [relevance conditional]
b. If you like him, you should help him. [factual conditional]
Broadly speaking, hypothetical conditionals like those in (2) assert that a certain
relationship holds between the truth of the antecedent and that of the consequent.
In contrast, relevance and factual conditionals are often grouped together as speech
act conditionals as they express a dependence between the truth of the antecedent
We thank the audience at SALT 19 for comments and discussions.
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and the relevance or felicity of the speech act performed with the consequent. Even
in case of an assertive consequent, the truth of the consequent is only indirectly
involved inasmuch as it figures at the speech-act level.
One might not expect CIs to ever constitute hypothetical conditionals. It
is often argued that the question of “truth” is beside the point when it comes to
imperatives, and that they should instead be analyzed in terms of the felicity and
successful execution of non-constative speech acts. However, Schwager (2006a)
shows that according to standard tests (cf. Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006), all three
types of conditionals can be exemplified by CIs. In particular, modification with
only and binding from the consequent into the antecedent occur with hypotheti-
cal conditionals only. Under these criteria, the CIs in (4) and (5) are hypothetical
conditionals.
(4) a. Turn right only if you are at an intersection.
b. Call a doctor only if you are sick.
(5) a. If you really like iti, [a donkey]i will be grateful.
b. If iti is tired, let [a donkey]i rest.
In contrast, the CIs in (6) arguably constitute speech act conditionals.
(6) a. If I may give you some advice, don’t go. [relevance CI]
b. If you are so smart, then do it yourself. [factual CI]
The upshot is that CIs do not belong to a single class of conditionals, and a truly
comprehensive unified account must treat each of the subclasses on a par with the
corresponding non-imperative conditionals. In this paper, however, we stop short of
attempting such broad coverage, focusing instead on hypothetical CIs with the more
modest goal of providing an account which unifies them with ordinary hypothetical
conditionals. What we need, then, is an analysis of imperatives in terms of truth
conditions and a framework for conditionals that is compatible with this analysis.
2. Formal Background
While we aim to keep the discussion rather informal throughout most of the paper,
we do make reference to a few formal model-theoretic notions. In this section
we briefly introduce those tools. We take as given a non-empty set W of possible
worlds. Atomic sentences denote subsets of W (i.e., propositions). Our goal is to
define the denotations of conditionals, imperatives, and ultimately CIs.
2.1. Modality and Conditionals
We follow Kratzer (1981) in analyzing conditionals as modal expressions whose
consequent is the prejacent of a(n overt or covert) modal operator and whose an-
tecedent serves to restrict the modal base of that operator. Modal sentences are
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interpreted relative to two parameters f ,g. Both are conversational backgrounds in
Kratzer’s terms, i.e., functions from worlds to sets of propositions. The first one de-
termines which worlds form the domain relative to which the modal expressions in
question are to be interpreted, much like the accessibility relations famliar in modal
logic. For each world w, we call the set
⋂
f (w) (the worlds at which all propositions
in f (w) are true) the modal base at w. The second parameter g is an ordering source
inducing, for each world w, a pre-order on the set of worlds as defined in (7a). De-
pending on the way g is interpreted, u ≤ g(w)v means that u is less far-fetched than v,
preferable to v, or “better” than v in some other contextually salient respect. We
assume for simplicity that g(w) is finite for all g,w. Then there is guaranteed to be a
set of minimal or “best” worlds for any modal base. We refer to this set as in (7b).
(7) a. u ≤ g(w)v iff {p ∈ g(w)|v ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ g(w)|u ∈ p}
b. O(w, f ,g) :=
{
u ∈⋂ f (w) ∣∣∣∣∀v ∈⋂ f (w) [v ≤ g(w)u→ u ≤ g(w)v]}
We add a human necessity modal operator H to the language whose interpretation
relative to a world w, modal base f and ordering source g is defined in (8a). A
special case is the simple necessity operator, defined in (8b) as shorthand for human
necessity relative to a constant ordering source whose value is the empty set of
propositions. In this case the sentence is true iff its prejacent is true at all worlds in
the modal base.
(8) a. Hϕ is true w.r.t. w, f ,g iff ϕ is true at all worlds in O(w, f ,g).
b. ϕ is true w.r.t. w, f iff Hϕ is true w.r.t. w, f ,λv[∅].
As mentioned above, a conditional antecedent acts as a restrictor on the modal base
relative to which the consequent is evaluated. Kratzer (1981) assumes that when
no overt modal auxiliary is present, the default is an epistemic human-necessity
operator. Kaufmann (2005) claims that the default is a simple-necessity operator
introduced by tense. Regardless of the source of the modal operator, the interpreta-
tion is as defined in (9). Here and below, we schematically add the subscript ‘[ϕ]’
to represent a modal operator modified by a conditional antecedent, and we let ϕ′
stand for the set of worlds at which ϕ is true.
(9) H[ϕ][ψ] is true w.r.t. w, f ,g iff Hψ is true w.r.t. w,λv
[
f (v)∪{ϕ′}] ,g.
Replacing f with f ′ = λv[ f (w)∪{ϕ′}] has the effect that ⋂ f ′(w) = ⋂[ f (w)∪{ϕ′}]
=
[⋂
f (w)
]∩ϕ′. Thus the antecedent in (9) does restrict the modal base. It does not
follow, however, that O(w, f ′,g) and O(w, f ,g) stand in any particular relation. For
instance, they are disjoint whenever both are non-empty and ϕ is false at all worlds
in O(w, f ,g). This captures the non-monotonic behavior of conditionals, i.e., the
fact that it is possible that ‘ Hψ’ is true while ‘ H[ϕ]ψ’ is false.
The model as we assume it here does not include a temporal dimension and
is therefore ill-suited for the analysis of certain subtle but important details of the
interpretation of temporal expressions in conditionals. This is a drawback in the
case of CIs as well. For instance, a crucial distinction Kaufmann (2005) makes
in his treatment of indicative conditionals is between non-predictive and predictive
ones, illustrated in (1) above, repeated here as (10).
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(10) a. If you are at an intersection, turn right! [non-predictive]
b. If you reach an intersection, turn right! [predictive]
The issue of tense and temporal reference is important, yet many insights about CIs
can be gained without going into this topic. We thus decide to leave it aside for the
moment.
2.2. Imperatives
Imperatives pose problems for any standard framework in formal semantics. First,
as they do not seem to have truth values, it is not clear that an interpretation in terms
of truth conditions is appropriate. At the same time, they show very limited ability
to occur embedded in larger truth-value-bearing constructions that could help illu-
minate their contribution. Second, imperatives seem to guide action rather than give
information, so it is not obvious how to treat them in terms of dynamic effects on
belief states. It may seem more natural to associate them semantically with some
sort of directive speech act. But even if we could find a non-ad hoc way of associat-
ing linguistic objects with speech acts, we would still face the problem that there is
no straightforward common core to the broad range of speech acts that imperatives
are used for. They easily express not only commands or requests, but also wishes,
advice, curses, etc. Therefore their semantic interpretation cannot strictly determine
the speech act they are used for.
In this paper we follow Schwager (2006b), who proposes to assimilate im-
peratives to performative modal verbs. It has been observed that modal verbs can
both describe and change deontic necessities (Kamp, 1973). In the latter case, sen-
tences containing modal verbs behave much like imperatives, for instance in that
follow-ups by That’s (not) true are infelicitous.
(11) a. You may close the door (that’s what the sign says). [descriptive]
b. A: You may close the door! - B: #That’s (not) true. [performative]
The recent literature converges on the assumption that there is no semantic dif-
ference between may as used in (11a) and in (11b) (Kamp, 1978; Schulz, 2003;
Schwager, 2006b). Rather, it is under particular contextual settings that modalized
sentences have a non-descriptive effect, rendering them self-verifying.
The contextual settings responsible for this effect can be characterized on
the basis of the semantics for modal verbs introduced above. Schwager (2006b)
singles out the following factors: (i) performatives are concerned with courses of
events deemed possible by the interlocutors, hence the modal base is constituted by
the context set (the set of worlds verifying all and only the mutual joint beliefs of
the interlocutors, cf. Stalnaker, 1978, 2002) or a subset thereof;1 (ii) the ordering
source is deontic, teleological, or bouletic (“prioritizing,” cf. Portner, 2007); (iii) the
1For unembedded imperatives, the latter qualification is needed as in the case of advice the
speaker typically gives information not about preferences (the odering source), but about facts in the
world, (cf. Schwager, 2006b for details).
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speaker is taken to have perfect knowledge of both modal base and ordering source,
that is, he counts as an epistemic authority on both matters; (iv) the speaker is taken
to consider the prejacent possible; and (v) the negation of the prejacent does not
follow from what is optimal w.r.t. the speaker’s wishes.2
Formally, we assume that imperatives contain a covert modal operator !
similar to H (human necessity, see Section 2.1). In contrast to modal auxiliaries,
imperatives can only be used performatively.3 This falls out if the conditions (i)-(v)
are adopted as presuppositions introduced by !. Their versatility in use (e.g., as
commands, requests, wishes, or advice) follows from the context dependence of !,
which can take a deontic, bouletic or teleological ordering source associated with
some contextually given attitude holder, typically the speaker or the addressee. For
example, an imperative used for requesting can be analyzed as follows:4
(12) Give me a call!
! [A calls S ] is true w.r.t. w, f ,g iff at all worlds in O(w, f ,g)A calls S,
where for any world v, f (v) is the set of the interlocutors’ mutual joint beliefs
and g(v) the set of propositions desired by S in v.
A use of (12) is felicitous only if it is mutual joint belief that the speaker knows what
his wishes are (epistemic authority) and considers it possible for the addressee to
call him. Moreover, it has to be mutual joint belief (or be accommodated as such)
that the speaker does not have a strict preference against the addressee calling him.
3. Conditional Imperatives
With the background on conditionals and imperatives in place, we now turn to con-
ditional imperatives. We assume that the basic assumptions we make about im-
peratives hold regardless of whether they occur in isolation or in conditionals. In
order to arrive at a plausible analysis, then, two major questions about ! need to
be addressed. The first concerns its structural place in the denotations of condi-
tional imperatives. The formal framework developed so far makes two construals
available for a sentence of the form (13):5
(13) If A, B!
2(iv) and (v) deviate slightly from Schwager (2006b). Instead of (iv) she requires also that the
speaker be taken to consider the prejacent’s negation possible. This is problematic in view of the
acceptability of examples like (15b). Instead of (v) she requires that the speaker is known to consider
the ordering source a good guideline for acting. This formulation seems too strong as, e.g. in the
case of a hearer bouletic ordering source, other propositions may be entailed s.t. the speaker does
not want the hearer to act upon them.
3We follow Portner (2009) in that “performative” has to be understood in a broader sense of “non-
assertive,” rather than always requiring self-verification of the corresponding modalized sentence.
4The symbols S andA in the definitions refer to the speaker and the addressee, respectively.
5Strictly speaking, of course, an infinite number of construals are available, some of them (e.g.,
‘ H
[
![A][B]
]
’) perhaps somewhat more plausible than others (e.g., ‘ !
[
H[A][B]
]
’). We discuss only
what are generally considered the most plausible ones without justifying this selection.
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a. ![A][B] Overt Conditional Operator (OCO)
b. H[A][ !B] Covert Conditional Operator (CCO)
Under the Overt Conditional Operator construal (13a), the antecedent directly re-
stricts the modal base of the imperative operator !. The Covert Conditional Opera-
tor construal (13b) locates ! in the nuclear scope of an implicit epistemic operator
whose modal base is restricted by the antecedent. At first glance, both analyses
seem possible: On the one hand we have seen no reason why ! could not be modi-
fied by the if -clause, but on the other hand a covert epistemic operator is needed in-
dependently for ordinary declarative conditionals without an overt epistemic modal,
including ones with root modals in the consequent.6
The second question to be addressed concerns the modal base of !. Granting
that the ordering source represents the preferences of a contextually salient agent,
we still need to know which set of worlds is ranked by these preferences. Here too,
several possibilities are available, including for instance the speaker’s belief state,
i.e., the set of all worlds compatible with what the speaker believes, or the subset of
antecedent-worlds within the speaker’s belief state.
Although the above two questions are distinct, an answer to one cannot be
evaluated without fixing an answer to the other, therefore they cannot easily be
discussed separately. In the remainder of this section we explore the consequences
of each of the two construals in (13) in conjunction with various plausible choices
for the modal base.
3.1. Overt Conditional Operator
Under the OCO construal, the modal base of ! is restricted by the if -clause to those
worlds at which the antecedent is true. Thus for instance, (14) is true just in case
the speaker’s preferences rank some worlds at which the addressee sees and greets
Julie higher than all worlds at which she sees Julie and does not greet her.
(14) If you see Julie, say ‘hi’!
![A sees Julie]
[A says ‘hi’] is true w.r.t. w, f ,g iff at all worlds in O(w, f ,g) at
whichA sees Julie,A greets her.
This interpretation is problematic. In showing this, we first discuss the closely
related case of conditionals with declarative consequents containing prioritizing
modals, such as If A, you should/must/have to B. Previous research has yielded con-
clusive arguments against an OCO construal for those sentences, but not all of those
arguments carry over straightforwardly to CIs. We show that this has independent
reasons and therefore does not amount to an argument for an OCO construal of CIs.
We then give a novel argument against OCO which has not been made elsewhere
6Schwager (2006a) argues that it is necessary to draw on both kinds of construals in order to cap-
ture all kinds of examples. We show in passing that her arguments depend on unnecessary assump-
tions about the exact content of the ordering sources involved, and come up with an independent
preference for an overall use of CCO construals.
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but applies equally to CIs and conditional declaratives with prioritizing modals in
the consequent.
3.1.1. Known problems with OCO
It has long been known that deontic modals in declarative consequents do not seem
to be modified by their antecedents. For instance, such an analysis would wrongly
predict that sentences like (15a) are necessarily true (Frank, 1996; Zvolenszky,
2002). The same prediction would follow for CIs like (15b) under an OCO analysis.
(15) a. If you drink Pepsi, you must drink Pepsi.
b. If you drink Pepsi, drink Pepsi!
Clearly once the modal base is restricted to A-worlds, the most preferred ones
among them must again be A-worlds. But it is not immediately obvious for either
of the examples in (15) that it is trivally true.
Not all arguments against an OCO analysis for deontic modals in condi-
tional consequents apply to CIs. For instance, Frank (1996) notes that the inter-
pretation of such modals can depend on the values of the ordering source at other
worlds. Thus (16) may be true even at worlds at which there are laws against work-
ing longer hours and the new laws do not go through.
(16) If the new laws for opening hours of shops go through, salespeople will have
to work longer.
This would be unexpected if the deontic modal operator were targeted by the an-
tecedent, since that would merely restrict the modal base without altering the or-
dering source. The argument does not apply to CIs because it presupposes that the
relevant ordering source can take on different values at different worlds in the modal
base. While this makes sense for statements about laws, when applied to CIs it vi-
olates the condition that the speaker be an authority on the relevant preferences.7
Both for CIs and for conditionalized deontic modals, the alternative to an
OCO account is a CCO account under which the antecedent restricts the modal
base of a covert epistemic operator in whose nuclear scope the deontic modal is
embedded. For deontic modals, Frank (1996) notes that this also seems compelling
in that the covert epistemic modal postulated can be replaced with explicit modal
adverbs with various forces, regardless of the force of the deontic modal:
7Schwager (2006a) comes up with an example that, at first glance, seems to violate this require-
ment. Assume that the speaker has a preference for law-obedience. Then, intuitively, (i) is true.
(i) If jaywalking is illegal, don’t do it.
Strictly speaking, the legal status of jaywalking does not influence the speaker’s preferences (as he
may not know what the status is in a particular world), but it influences what the speaker’s preference
amounts to. This is captured correctly if the speaker’s preference constantly contains the proposition
‘λw.you obey the law in w’.
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(17) If Max stays with his grandmother, he
{
necessarily
possibly
} {
must
may
}
walk the dog.
This argument does not apply directly to CIs because imperatives are not subject
to modification with adverbs like necessarily due to their special contextual pre-
suppositions. We can conclude from this discussion, however, that there are good
arguments against OCO and in favor of CCO for deontic modals in general, and
that these arguments suggest the same for CIs to the extent that they apply to them.
3.1.2. A new argument against OCO
A further problem with the OCO construal emerges when we take into account the
interaction of prioritizing modality with assumptions about stereotypical courses of
events. Although we discuss it only for CIs, it carries over to prioritizing modals.
Consider first the sequence in (18). According to OCO, (18a) asserts that among all
the worlds at which the addressee loses her job, the most preferable ones from the
speaker’s perspective are ones at which she accepts a lower-paying one. Notice that
the speaker can continue with (18b) without contradicting himself.
(18) a. If you lose your job, take a lower-paying one.
b. But if you lose your job and have a comparable offer, don’t take a lower-
paying one.
Formally, (18) is analogous to standard counterexamples to Strengthening of the
Antecedent, the inference from if A, C to if AB, C. In Kratzer-style semantics, the
invalidity of this pattern is accounted for by allowing that the set of AB-worlds
relevant for the evaluation of the latter is not contained in the set of A-worlds rele-
vant for the former. As outlined in Section 2.1, the selection of the relevant worlds
is driven by the ordering source. With a bouletic ordering source, Strengthening
of the Antecedent fails if AB is not the most preferred way for A to come about
and C is true at the most preferred A-worlds but false at some or all of the most
preferred AB-worlds.
In fact, (18) is a particularly strong counterexample in that the imperative
consequents are not only contradictories but contraries of each other. In this case,
the set of relevant AB-worlds must be disjoint from the set of relevant A-worlds in
order for both sentences to be true. Thus in (18) it must be the case that among all
the worlds at which the addressee is laid off, some of the ones at which she does
not have a comparable offer are strictly preferred over all the ones at wich she does.
But clearly this prediction is wrong: The CIs do not jointly imply that the speaker
wishes that the addressee have no comparable offer in case she loses her job.
Intuitively, the reason why (18) lacks this implication is that losing one’s
job with a comparable offer in hand may be so remote or far-fetched a possibility
that it does not enter the interpretation of (18a) at all. Seen this way, the selection
of the antecedent-worlds relevant for the interpretation of each of the CIs appears
to be driven by criteria like salience, likelihood, or stereotypicality. We do not take
a stance on which of these related but distinct notions is at play in our particular
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example. For concreteness, we speak of stereotypicality in the remainder. What is
important is that whichever notion is operative, it is separate from and independent
of the speaker’s preferences, hence the OCO analysis does not capture it.
One might attempt to remedy this problem within an OCO account by build-
ing stereotypicality into the semantics of the imperative. Whatever the details of the
formal implementation of this idea might be, its semantic import would have to be
that of a two-step interpretation under which the set of antecedent-worlds is first
filtered by a stereotypical ordering source, and only the “best” worlds under that
ranking are then further ranked according to the speaker’s preferences. And if (and
since) the imperative operator is to receive the same interpretation in matrix con-
texts as in CIs and the role of the if -clause is merely to restrict its modal base, then
the modal base, restricted or not, should always be pre-ranked by stereotypicality.
Such a move would be questionable, however, for at least two reasons. One
is that as we described it in the previous paragraph, the first step may well filter
out as non-stereotypical all worlds in the (restricted) modal base at which the pre-
jacent is true, rendering the imperative false. Therefore the account would predict
that an imperative cannot be true unless its prejacent is stereotypical (in the case
of CIs, stereotypical relative to the antecedent-worlds). Now, care must be taken in
evaluating this prediction: We have to grant that speakers take into account the fact
that they are about to issue the imperative and assess stereotypicality only on that
basis. Thus the prediction is merely that they consider the prejacent stereotypical,
given that they issue the imperative. But even this would be too strong: Mutinies
and revolutions, especially failed ones, are rife with orders which take effect even
though the speaker believes that the addressee will refuse to obey them.8 It may
be possible to refine the double-filtering approach in such a way that epistemic un-
certainty and speaker preferences interact in more subtle ways. The idea would be
that the pre-selection by stereotypicality is based only on what (the speaker thinks)
the most likely objective circumstances are under which the addressee must act,
disregarding the question of what the addressee will stereotypically do under those
circumstances. Our implementation of this refinement would rely on the notion of
historical alternatives, which we introduce in Section 3.2.3 below. By then we will
have collected independent arguments against the OCO, however, having to do with
the second reason why the use of two ordering sources is questionable.
The second problem with the double-filtering idea arises from two theory-
internal facts. First, a dependence on the application of two ordering sources in a
particular order does not generally appear to be necessary for prioritizing modals.
Second, we will see in Section 3.2.2 that the approach is semantically equivalent
to one version of the CCO account. Both run afoul of further examples which we
discuss below, but only the CCO lends itself naturally to further refinements which
8It may seem that such a situation would violate Schwager’s (2006b) Epistemic Uncertainty
Constraint (EUC), which requires that the prejacent be consistent with the speaker’s beliefs. But
that would be a misconstrual of the EUC, which only requires that the prejacent be possible relative
to the speaker’s belief state. It says nothing about the prejacent’s likelihood or the addressee’s
intentions. To satisfy the EUC, it is sufficient that the speaker is taken to believe that the addressee
is (objectively) in a position to bring about the truth of the prejacent.
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address those problems without dramatic and stipulative departures from the stan-
dard semantics of modality. This second theory-internal argument against the OCO
is ultimately decisive in our decision to favor the CCO.
3.2. Covert Conditional Operator
It may seem odd that one would even consider an analysis according to which
imperatives are embedded under epistemic modal operators. After all, it is well-
known that imperatives resist embedding in general. But imperatives do in fact
occur in a range of embedded contexts, albeit a limited one, including modal subor-
dination (Schwager, 2006a,b) and reported speech (Crnicˇ and Trinh, 2009; Portner,
2007; Schwager, 2006b; Poschmann and Schwager, 2008). Such facts undermine
the claim that imperatives cannot occur in embedded contexts and make a CCO
analysis worth exploring.
Under a CCO construal, If A, B! states that at those worlds at which A is
true, B is preferred. Thus the conditional consequent is evaluated point-wise at the
antecedent worlds. If the force of the outer epistemic modal is human necessity
relative to a stereotypical ordering source, then the truth conditions are as in (19).
(19) If you get lost, call me!
a. H[you get lost]
[
!you call me
]
is true w.r.t. w, f ,g iff for all worlds w′ ∈
O(w, f ,g) at whichA gets lost, ![you call me] is true at w′, f ′,g′.
b. ![you call me] is true w.r.t. w′, f ′,g′ iff at all worlds in O(w′, f ′,g′), A
calls S.
This analysis assumes that two modal operators are involved in CIs, each with a
modal base and an ordering source, referred to in (19) as f ,g and f ′,g′, respectively.
By assumption, the modal base of the outer epistemic operator is the speaker’s
belief state, ranked by a stereotypical ordering source. We also assume, based on
the meaning of imperatives in general, that the ordering source of the embedded
imperative reflects the contextually given preferences. But what should the modal
base of the embedded imperative be?
Imperatives in CI consequents, like matrix imperatives, are concerned with
possible courses of events. Thus (19) should not be falsified by the existence of
worlds where calling is superfluous because the addressee miraculously develops
perfect knowledge of the area the moment she is lost – such worlds may be highly
desirable but have no effect on the interpretation of the imperative in the conse-
quent, just as they are disregarded by stand-alone imperatives. This is ensured by
considering only worlds in the context set. In the following, we discuss three pos-
sibilities in turn: the context set itself, the antecedent worlds within the context set,
and the set of historical alternatives of each world in the context set. The discussion
thus proceeds from the most “gobal” to the most “local” notion. We show that the
last option is most adequate in light of certain basic intuitions about CIs.
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3.2.1. Context set
First, suppose the modal base relevant for the imperative consequent is the set of all
worlds in the context set, and consider the CI in (20).
(20) If you get lost, call me!
true at w iff for all stereotypical worlds w′ consistent with S’s beliefs in w
such that A gets lost at w′, the preferences at w′ rank highest those worlds
in the context set at whichA calls S.
As mentioned above, we follow Stalnaker (1978, 2002) in taking the context set to
verify exactly the beliefs which the interlocutors implicitly agree to take for granted
for the sake of the conversation. The most relevant feature of this construct is that
it represents not only their shared beliefs about the external facts, but also their
mutual beliefs about each other. For instance, it may be mutually believed for some
proposition p that the speaker does and the addressee does not have a definite belief
as to whether p is true or false. In such a case, at each world w′ in the context set,
p is either true at all worlds in the speaker’s belief state at w′ or false at all of them,
while the addressee’s belief state at w′ comprises both p-worlds and p¯-worlds.
Suppose for example that the relevant preferences are the speaker’s, who
(i) has an unconditional preference for the addressee not to get lost; and (ii) has
no unconditional preference for or against being called. Intuitively the CI in (20)
is consistent with this situation. But according to the truth conditions, it is false.
For consider a stereotypical world w′ in the speaker’s belief state at which the an-
tecedent is true, i.e., the addressee gets lost. By the authority condition and assump-
tion (i), the speaker’s preferences at w′ rank highest those worlds in the context set
at which the addressee does not get lost. By assumption (ii), that set of highest-
ranking worlds contains both worlds at which she calls him and worlds at which
she does not, hence the CI is false. Intuitively, if the CI is true, then it is because
among the worlds at which the addressee gets lost, the speaker ranks highest those
at which she calls. But assumption (i) implies that those worlds, like all antecedent-
worlds, are strictly outranked by ones at which she does not get lost.
Thus if the entire context set is taken to be the modal base for the impera-
tive, then (20) implies that an unconditional preference for calling be in effect at the
relevant antecedent-worlds. On the other hand, the CI does not imply that an uncon-
ditional preference for calling is in effect at all worlds in the speaker’s belief state.
These requirements cannot both be met unless either the modal base or the ordering
source (or both) is allowed to vary between worlds depending on the truth or false-
hood of the antecedent. We maintain that the ordering source should not vary: Even
if the authority condition were not as eminently plausible a condition in itself as it
is in our view, it would still be questionable to make the truth of the CI dependent
upon uncertainty on the part of the speaker about the relevant preferences.
The upshot is that the relevant modal base for examples like ours must be a
proper subset of the context set which contains only worlds at which the addressee
is lost. What should this subset be?
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3.2.2. Antecedent Worlds9
One possibility is to make the set of antecedent-worlds in the context set the modal
base of the imperative consequent. In our example, repeated as (21) with adjusted
truth conditions, this means that at worlds at which the addressee gets lost, only
worlds at which she gets lost are relevant to the truth of the consequent; similarly
for worlds at which she does not get lost.10
(21) If you get lost, call me!
true in w iff for all stereotypical worlds w′ consistent with S’s beliefs in w
such that A gets lost at w′, S’s preferences at w′ rank highest among the
worlds in the context set at whichA gets lost, those at whichA calls S.
Suppose again that the speaker prefers that the addressee not get lost, and consider
a world w′ in the speaker’s belief state at which she does get lost. What should we
assume about the speaker’s preferences in order to derive plausible truth conditions
for the CI?
The first thing to note is that the speaker’s desires should not directly de-
termine a preference for calling. This follows again from the assumption that the
speaker knows his own preferences (i.e., that they are the same at all worlds in his
belief state) together with the observation that no preference for calling is implied
by (21) unless the addressee is in fact lost. Nor is it sufficient for the speaker’s pref-
erences to be limited to an attitude towards the truth or falsehood of the antecedent.
For suppose, as in the last subsection, that the ordering source at w′ contains only
the proposition that the addressee not get lost. Since the modal base is restricted to
worlds at which the addressee is lost, this ordering source would not differentiate
between them, and the order it induces would be the universal relation on the modal
base. But then (21) is false, unless it is already known that the addressee calls at all
worlds at which she lost, which is clearly not implied.
So we need to assume that the speaker’s preferences jointly with the modal
base yield a preference for calling. This means that among the antecedent-worlds in
the context set, his ordering source ranks some higher than others. For instance, the
speaker may want to meet with the addressee for dinner, and among all the worlds
at which she is lost, the ones at which the dinner takes place as hoped are ones at
which she calls. No global preference for calling is implied, since it may well be
that not getting lost alone is also sufficient to secure the dinner together. Crucial
for getting plausible truth conditions for CIs in this way is that the ordering source
include propositions which “cut across” the set of antecedent worlds, ranking some
higher than others.
Thus by restricting the modal base to the antecedent-worlds in the context
set, we can account for the truth of (21) in the given scenario. This is an improve-
9Schwager (2006a) considers only this possibility, but dismisses it as ad hoc. She therefore
considers examples like (20) evidence in favor of an OCO construal. We argue below that it is not
OCO, but a certain modification for CCO, that makes the best predictions even for these cases.
10This analysis, as well as the one in Section 3.2.3 below, predict that the “Pepsi CI” in (15b) is
trivially true. We reserve an a discussion of this prediction for future work. XXXXXXXXXX
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ment over the interpretation in Section 3.2.1 above, which took the entire context
set as the modal base. Nevertheless, having this in place, the account still runs
into problems in connection with different types of contextually possible antecedent
worlds. For example, consider the following variant of the scenario underlying (21).
The addressee will spend her day sightseeing either in Chicago or in Evanston. The
speaker’s preferences are encoded in an ordering source which, at each world in
the speaker’s belief state, contains two propositions: (i) that the speaker and the
addressee meet for dinner at the end of the day; and (ii) that they meet for dinner
and save money. Among the stereotypical worlds in the context set at which the
addressee gets lost, we find both worlds where she gets lost in Evanston and worlds
where she gets lost in Chicago, but no matter where she gets lost, the only way
to secure the dinner is to get in touch. Calling is an option in either city, but it is
also costly. In Evanston, but not in Chicago, free wireless internet is a cost-saving
alternative.
Now the set of worlds at which the antecedent is true includes ones in which
she is lost in Chicago and ones in which she is lost in Evanston. Clearly most pre-
ferred among these, given the preferences (i) and (ii) above, are ones at which she
gets in touch via free wireless internet, for these are worlds at which she saves
money while also securing the joint dinner. In this scenario, the formal account
makes two false predictions: First, (21) now comes out false, even though intu-
itively calling is still the best course of action for the addressee. Secondly, we
predict that the CI in (22) is true. But intuitively (22) should come out false: The
addressee may well get lost in Chicago, and in that case emailing is not even an
option!
(22) If you get lost, email me!
This example highlights a problem which we have sidestepped so far, but which
must be addressed eventually if we are to obtain a plausible account of CIs: By
using the entire set of contextually plausible antecedent-worlds as the modal base
for the imperative we are missing the fact that the question of what the best course
of action is – both in the sense of which actions are available to the addressee
and in terms of the likely consequences of those actions – may depend on con-
tingencies that are not mentioned in either constituent of the CI. In our scenario,
the speaker’s preferences are responsible for the truth of certain conditional non-
imperatives, such as the sentences in (23), but not the CI in (22).
(23) a. If you get lost, I hope it is in Evanston.
b. If you get lost, it would be good if you could email me.
The crucial difference is, of course, that while the speaker may hope that the ad-
dressee is lost in Evanston and not in Chicago, he cannot tell/ask her to be lost in
Evanston. The Evanston-worlds are irrelevant to the interpretation of the imperative
at worlds at which the addressee is lost in Chicago, simply because at those worlds
it is beyond her powers to make it such that she is lost anywhere else.
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3.2.3. Historical Alternatives
The conclusion of the last subsection suggests that objective circumstances should
play a role in the interpretation of imperatives. The third option for determining the
modal base rests on the idea that facts which are unalterable at the world and time of
evaluation must be accounted for. The formal implementation of this idea requires
that we add a temporal dimension to the model. Here we only give an informal
description of the main points.
The basic idea is to restrict the modal base, at each world w′ in the speaker’s
belief state, to the historical alternatives of w′ at the time at which the antecedent
is evaluated. The notion of a historical alternative has been found to play a role in
the semantic interaction between expressions of modality, including conditionals,
and temporality (see Thomason, 1984 for a discussion of the formal background,
and Condoravdi, 2002, Kaufmann, 2005 for linguistic applications). It is meant to
account for the intuition that there is a fundamental asymmetry between a “fixed”
past and present on the one hand, and an “open” future, on the other: At any time t,
each possible world has exactly one history leading up to and including t, whereas
there are multiple possible continuations from t on; which of these possible courses
of events is the actual one is not decided until the relevant later time comes to pass.
Formally, for any world w and time t, the set of historical alternatives of w at t
consists entirely of worlds indistinguishable from w at all times up to t. Variation
among the historical alternatives is only possible with respect to times later than t.
Among the linguistic facts whose analysis appeals to this asymmetry is that
modal sentences with past or present reference in the prejacent can only have an
epistemic interpretation, reflecting subjective uncertainty, whereas with future ref-
erence an additional, metaphysical or objective reading becomes available. But
objective uncertainty has epistemic consequences: What is not objectively settled
cannot possibly be known in advance. Formally, this amounts to a constraint on the
relation between the historical alternatives at a given time and the epistemic alter-
natives modeling the speaker’s belief state at that time: Epistemic states must be
unions of entire classes of historical alternatives; they must not “cut across” them,
including some but not all historical alternatives of some world at the given time.
Such cross-cutting would amount to knowledge of future facts which are not yet ob-
jectively determined, which we assume is impossible. Crucially for our purposes,
for any time t and world w′ in the speaker’s belief state at t, the set of historical
alternatives of w′ at t is guaranteed to be a subset of the speaker’s belief state at t.
Now, the interpretation of CIs, and indicative conditionals in general, in a
model which takes this interaction between modality and time seriously, is compli-
cated by the fact that the antecedent may be evaluated at times later than the speech
time. This is the case in (21) and (22) above: The antecedent can be paraphrased
as If (and when) you get lost at some (non-past) time . . . . Intuitively, the courses of
action available to the addressee in case she does get lost at some future time are
determined at that future time, not at the speech time at which the CI is issued and
interpreted. This is predicted as a consequence of a temporal shift into the future
that is always avaiable with indicative conditionals (Kaufmann, 2005) and which,
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importantly, affects the interpretation of both the antecedent and the consequent.
Thus if historical alternatives determine the modal base relevant for an imperative
consequent, it must be kept in mind that those are the historical alternatives at its
(possibly forward-shifted) interpretation time, not necessarily those at speech time.
With this background in place, let us now see how the restriction of the
modal base to the historical alternative fares with respect to our example (21), re-
peated here as (24).
(24) If you get lost, call me!
true in w iff for all stereotypical worlds w′ consistent with S’s beliefs such
that A gets lost at w′, S’s preferences rank highest among the historical
alternatives of w′ those at whichA calls S.
The first thing to note that these truth conditions are stronger than those in (21)
above, where the imperative was evaluated relative to the whole set of (rele-
vant) antecedent-worlds. Under that interpretation the imperative was true at all
antecedent-worlds if (and only if) it was true at any of them. This is because
the modal base is the same at all relevant antecedent-worlds (namely the set of
antecedent-worlds), and the ordering source is constant by assumption. In (24), in
contrast, the set of antecedent-worlds is partitioned into classes of historical alterna-
tives. Suppose the CI was true under the former interpretation. This means that the
addressee calls at all of the most preferred ones among the antecedent-worlds. Each
of them will also be among the most preferred ones within its local class of histor-
ical alternatives – but, crucially, not vice versa: There may be worlds that are most
preferred locally (among their historical alternatives) but not relative to the entire
set of antecedent worlds. This means that a CI that was true under the interpretion
in (21) may now be false under (24). On the other hand, the increased locality can-
not in itself render a CI that was false relative to the set of antecedent-worlds true
relative to historical alternatives.
This argument makes clear that so far, we have only solved part of the
problem. Recall that in Section 3.2.2 we showed that by taking the antecedent-
worlds as the modal base we ended up with two incorrect predictions for the
Chicago/Evanston scenario: Sentence (24) was predicted to be false, while (22),
repeated here as (25), was predicted to be true.
(25) If you get lost, email me!
Now the analysis in terms of historical alternatives correctly predicts the falsehood
of (25). Emailing is not even an option at some of the (relevant) antecedent-worlds,
let alone a preferred one. And since the CI requires for its truth that the consequent
come out true point-wise at all (relevant) antecedent-worlds, the CI is correctly
predicted to be false.
3.2.4. Metalinguistic considerations
While the falsehood (25) is now accounted for, (24) is still not predicted to be true
in the Chicago/Evanston example. The problem is that our truth conditions require
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that in order for the CI to be true, calling must be the preferred course of action
at all (relevant) antecedent-worlds. This is not the case in the scenario: At worlds
at which the addressee gets lost in Evanston and therefore has access to email,
the worlds ranked highest by the speaker’s preferences do not include any calling
worlds, as they are too costly.
Let us be clear about the scope of this problem. Although it turned up in
our discussion of conditional imperatives, it is in fact not confined to this particular
set of data. It arises just the same if we restrict our attention to simple impera-
tives like (26) relative to a scenario which is similar to the Chicago/Evanston story
discussed thus far, except that the addressee is lost already, talking to the speaker
on the phone, and the only way to ensure their joint dinner is to get in touch with
Eva (subject to the same contingencies w.r.t. money and wifi availabilities). If the
speaker does not know in which city the addressee is and the facts are as before,
then (26) is felt to be true. Again the problem is not confined to imperatives but
arises with modal verbs just the same.11
(26) a. Call Eva!
b. You should call Eva!
The general problem can be stated as follows: If the speaker wants to give advice as
to what is the best course of action but does not know what the circumstances are or
will be under which the addressee has to act, he can apparently call an action α the
best option even if, strictly speaking, α is not the best option at all relevant worlds,
but dominated “locally” at some worlds by an option β. Note that this is subject to
two constraints: α must be available at all relevant worlds, and there are relevant
worlds at which β is not available (or possibly, in alternative scenarios, worlds at
which β is strongly dispreferred). This seems to be at odds with truth conditions
that flatly state that α is “the best option.” One possible adjustment would be to
weaken the truth conditions to require that α be “the best option guaranteed to be
available.” We might consider tying this to the epistemic uncertainty condition im-
posed on imperatives in general, which requires mutual joint belief that the speaker
considers the prejacent of the imperative possible. Alternatively, we could require
that α be “optimal”according to some weighted global comparisons scheme. But
we won’t pursue these directions here. Rather, we want to step back and reconsider
the felicity of the sentence in the given scenario. Strictly speaking, shouldn’t the
speaker have said something along the lines of (27)?
(27) If you get lost, call me or email me, depending on whether you are in
Chicago or in Evanston.
(27) would certainly have been an alternative, yet (24) seems acceptable, too. Let
us revisit the description of the scenario: We assumed an overall goal of meeting for
11The status of examples involving must or have to may be less clear, though, in this scenario. This
is in line with observations in the literature on anankastic conditionals (e.g. von Stechow et al., 2005),
where it is also argued that should and ought to are more readily felt to be true (and imperatives
pattern with them, cf. Schwager, 2006b) than must and have to.
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dinner, and a subsidary goal of saving money if possible. But if these were his only
concerns, the speaker should indeed have uttered (27), as (24) may well not lead to
the best outcome for him. This, we contend, is the correct judgment, whereas the
impression that (24) is true is due to tacit additional preferences, presumably either
(a) that the addressee have a simple enough plan, or (b) that the speaker not have to
give lengthy explanations. Both would be good reasons to prefer (24) over (27).
Yet, (a) and (b) do not just account for the speaker’s choice of words, they
also interact with the truth conditions (which crucially rely on speaker’s prefer-
ences) and render (24) true when added to the ordering source for the CI. Note
that (a) is unproblematic: We can ensure that having a simple plan outranks saving
money by construing the preferences as (i) we meet for dinner, (ii) we meet for
dinner and you follow a simple plan, (iii) we meet for dinner and you follow a sim-
ple plan and we save money. In that case, the highest ranked worlds are worlds at
which speaker and addressee meet for dinner and the addressee follows the simple
plan of calling (which is the best simple plan in view of the third goal of saving
money, outranking for example options like calling a helicopter). Things are less
straightforward with (b), which requires an adequate formalization of the interac-
tion between meta-linguistic (roughly, Gricean) and extra-linguistic preferences.
The issue is clearly not confined to CIs or imperatives.
Note that these more fine-grained preferences only help if the ordering hap-
pens pointwise. The solution does not carry over to the solution in terms of an-
tecedent worlds or its equivalent in terms of an OCO sensitive to stereotypicality.
Those theories still predict (22) to be true and (19) to be false.
4. Conclusions
We have shown that conditional imperatives of the hypothetical subtype can be
given a promising analysis if the imperative is understood as a modal operator of
human necessity embedded under a covert epistemic modal which is restricted to
quantify over antecedent worlds. We have discussed various possiblities of what the
imperative modal operator itself could quantify over. Ultimately, we believe to have
shown that pointwise quantification over (stereotypical) alternatives to each of the
worlds considered by the epistemic modal operator makes the best predictions. Still,
the discussion at the end of Section 3.2.4 shows that ordering sources seem to be a
somewhat crude tool for modeling the ranking of preferences, let alone the interac-
tion between extra-linguistic and meta-linguistic preferences. This could be taken
as an argument to switch to a framework that deals with utilities directly. Lastly, we
would like to point out that the remaining worries do not apply exclusively to con-
ditional imperatives, but affect conditionals containing other non-epistemic modals
as well. We consider this further support for theories that assimilate modals and
imperatives.
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